cult if not impossible to imagine a cause of action against the United States because of a congressional decision not to enter these fields. The federal legislature shall not make laws abridging freedom of speech," imposing bills of attainder, 9 or granting aristocratic tides,' among other things; where Congress violates these prohibitions, the courts remain largely available to vitiate the forbidden action.'" In contrast, in addition to imposing permissive and negative obligations like those found in the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions typically impose various affirmative constitutional obligations on state legislatures: they shall balance the budget, 2 protect the environment, 13 reapportion electoral districts, 4 or provide free public education. 15 When the states operating under such affirmative obligations 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I (precluding Congress from impairing free speech). 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (barring bills of attainder). 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting the granting of titles of nobility).
But cf Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 REV. , 1326 REV. (1984 (arguing that even negative rights can be thought of as imposing affirmative obligations on government since, in the modern administrative state, "all rights are to some extent positive, for the government is often in a position to deal mortal blows to the exercise of rights by simply ceasing to intervene" & POL. 153, 155 (1996) (noting that "forty-eight of the fifty states have some type of balanced budget restriction"). The Montana provision was recently construed as an affirmative obligation in Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486, 491 (Mont. 1994 ) (holding, inter alia, that the constitutional obligation to balance the budget "places a restriction on the legislature"). 1 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (declaring that "the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources"); see also Roland M. Frye, Jr., Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,028 (1975) 
(describing state constitutional protections of natural resources).
14 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI (outlining the legislature's responsibility to apportion voting districts); see alsoJeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY LJ. 1519 , 1542 , 1552 -64 (1994 (noting that state legislatures generally have primary control over voting districts, subject to federal constitutional constraints).
15 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (requiring the legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient" public education); see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 408 (2000) (showing that all fifty states have constitutional provisions providing for public education).
For a more crabbed view of state constitutional affirmative obligations, consider Justice Norcott's opinion in Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 760-64 (Conn. 1995) , denying a claim that Connecticut had an affirmative constitutional obligation to provide for [Vol. 151: 277 fail to comply, state courts are faced with the challenge of enforcing constitutional provisions against their own legislatures. This Comment will attempt precisely to identify the difficulties of judicial enforcement of affirmative constitutional obligations and will suggest that taking procedural formalities more seriously may result in effective enforcement. This issue will be examined through the lens of ongoing school desegregation efforts under the Connecticut Constitution.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of Connecticut's constitutional litigation concerning school desegregation and outline problems with enforcing the state supreme court's landmark 1996 desegregation case, Sheff v. ONeill.1 6 While the facts and law of this case will be addressed with specific attention to the Connecticut context, the issues uncovered illuminate problems of nationwide concern.
Part II will examine possible implied affirmative obligations in the Federal Constitution and consider how federal courts have enforced those obligations. More significantly, this Part will review efforts by some of Connecticut's sister states to enforce their own affirmative constitutional obligations. Part III will discuss broad problems inherent in judicial action mandating legislative conduct. Among these problems is the possibility that state legislatures may refuse to comply with their courts' decrees, a potentially serious threat to the legitimacy of state constitutionalism. As a solution, this Comment argues that state courts seeking to enforce affirmative obligations should make bold, morally confident decrees, but in close technical conformity with traditional concepts of civil procedure and legal formalism.
I. CONNECTICUT'S SHEFF LITIGATION
Developing an understanding of the Sheff case and its effects on Connecticut requires attention to a narrative beginning long before its indigent citizens. Although Connecticut's constitution includes explicit obligations to balance the budget, protect the environment, and reapportion electoral districts, the Moore court thought that provisions relating to the public schools and state university were "the only constitutional provisions, recognized to date, that impose affirmative obligations on the part of the state to expend public funds to afford benefits to its citizenry." Id. at 761. 16 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut has an affirmative constitutional obligation to eliminate de facto segregation in Hartford-area public schools).
seventeen schoolchildren sued their governor in 1989. School desegregation under the Connecticut Constitution implicates a complex socio-legal history extending back to the earliest days of the Connecticut Colony. While the characters and setting of this story are particular to the small state in question, the themes are far broader and more profound. Any government's relationship with its children is a sensitive and potentially controversial topic with inextricable moral concerns. Similarly, the effects of any law-inspired change in race relations extend well beyond law into morality and the society's very conception of itself." When, as with school desegregation, the race-tinged relationship between a government and its children is formally defined by the government's founding document, official decisions are likely to be affective as well as rational and cultural as well as legal. 18 The three strands of Connecticut history described below-public schools, state constitutionalism, and race relations-entwine from the earliest colonial days through the latest court opinions to form the story studied here. [Vol. 151: 277
A. The Early History of Public Education, Constitutionalism, and Race Relations in Connecticut
Hartford was founded in 1635 by Reverend Thomas Hooker, who walked with his congregation south from their Massachusetts church,'°l ocated one block away from the site of what was soon to become the Bay Colony's first public university (today known as Harvard College).2' Thus, even before the Connecticut Colony was organized, its founders were familiar with the value of state-sponsored schooling and came from a community committed to the ideal of public education. Within ten years of settlement upon the banks of the Connecticut River, the fledgling Hartford community hired a teacher, established a school tax, set a curriculum, and invited all community children to be 22 educated regardless of their economic status.
While the early Connecticut Colony was attending to the education of its youth, it also established a written framework of govern-23 ment, the Fundamental Orders. Under the authority of the government established by the Fundamental Orders, a colonial diplomat obtained from King Charles II a royal charter that was highly favorable to the colonists. 4 By 1697, local reverence for the charter had grown so strong that when King James II sent a military governor from Boston to Hartford to revoke it, local officials hid the charter in a nearby oak tree rather than surrender it. Economic and political discrimination severely restricted the rights of Connecticut's African-American citizens.
2 9 Because they could not legally own land, black Connecticutians were forced by economic necessity to live in cities, where rental housing and service sector jobs were more readily available.° In this way, the state's segregated housing patterns are the vestiges of early and longenduring racist laws.
In 1909, before large numbers of African-Americans fleeing southern poverty and Jim Crow discrimination had moved to Con- tion guaranteed them an integrated public education. The nature of the plaintiffs' demands was unprecedented, both in Connecticut and across the country. Although the plaintiffs' legal theory that the state officials had an affirmative obligation to desegregate the public schools asserted a dramatic and controversial claim against the state, the complaint was also noteworthy for three of its somewhat technical characteristics. .2d 1288 .2d , 1289 .2d -90 (Conn. 1996 (holding that where the plaintiffs sued the state directly "to compel the General Assembly to enact legislation that would implement the constitutional spending cap" there was no subject matter jurisdiction), the State of Connecticut's sovereign immunity would not apply to protect the general assembly this list of defendants was inadequate and that the suit should be dismissed for failure to join necessary parties (including the City of Hartford), but that motion was defeated and subsequently abandoned on appeal." A defense motion for summary judgment was denied in 1992. 4 In January 1993, nearly four years after the original filing, a trial finally began before superior court Judge Harry Hammer.
The plaintiffs' witnesses were put in the uncomfortable position of emphasizing the fundamental failures of the city's schools in order to buttress the plaintiffs' claim of an inadequate education under the state constitution.
5 6 This was most likely embarrassing to the school officials. Given the watching and credulous suburban parents' eagerness to believe the worst about city schools, the testimony was probably also damaging to any chance of persuading them that Hartford's schools were a good place for their children. Shortly after the testimony began, Governor O'Neill's successor, Lowell Weicker, Jr.," publicly ac- sion that "'there is a relatively high concentration of children from poor families and black and Hispanic students' in the Hartford public schools compared to the public schools in most of the twenty-one towns surrounding Hartford"). 61 See id. at *89 ("The court.., finds that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that 'state action is a direct and sufficient cause of the conditions' which are the subject matter of the plaintiffs' complaint... , and that accordingly the constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiffs need not be addressed.").
62 See id. at *80-89 (following Justice Douglas's treatment of various de facto school desegregation cases because he was "the principal and most consistent proponent of the view that strict constitutional liability... should be imposed on local and state governments for conditions of segregation that arose from demographic, social and economic forces"). 70 For a remarkable example of limpid language coupled with legal opacity, consider the following climactic passage:
In staying our hand, we do not wish to be misunderstood about the urgency of finding an appropriate remedy for the plight of Hartford's public schoolchildren. Every passing day denies these children their constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Every passing day shortchanges these children in their ability to learn to contribute to their own well-being and to that of this state and nation. We direct the legislature and the execu- and pursued a detailed review of the school financing scheme before affirming the trial court's declaration of unconstitutionality." The remedy, however, was left to the legislature. The plaintiffs returned to court and the supreme court ruled again in 1985, eight years after its first holding in the case. The 1985 court applied a relatively deferential review of the legislature's efforts at reform and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings without ordering a new remedy."O The Sheff court used the Horton precedents to establish the justiciability of the plaintiffs' suit against the state defendants.
8 ' The Horton litigation also provided the Sheff court with a rationale for holding the state strictly liable for its affirmative constitutional obligations."'
To evaluate the nature of those obligations, the Sheff court turned to the history of constitutionalized public education in Connecticut, particularly the debate transcripts and committee reports from the 1965 state constitutional convention. The court concluded that the convention delegates "intended to encompass de facto segregation in the circumstances presented by the present case. [Vol. 151: 277 schools. 85 To support its holding that state action was sufficiently implicated to hold the state accountable for unintentional school segregation, the majority also stridently repeated the trial court's finding that the statute establishing school district lines coterminously with town borders "is the single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system." 8 6 Strangely, however, the court's discussion of the districting statute, although plainly blaming that law for causing unconstitutional conditions, never directly declared the statute itself unconstitutional or unenforceable."
The court's bold work in holding the state to be in violation of its affirmative constitutional obligation was immediately undermined by its failure to provide a fruitful remedy. The majority opinion provided plenty of bombast about the importance of finding a remedy, 88 but granted only declaratory relief aimed at politely persuading the general assembly and champagne-popping governor to find a solution using "energy and good will. about reiterating the fact that there's racial imbalance in the cities, but they want us to solve it."'' The governor also publicly criticized the chief justice herself, "saying it was 'unfortunate' that one personPeters-could 'take an issue and force it back' on the legislature. ' " 9 Not everyone responded to the court's ruling as angrily as the lead defendant, however. Perhaps predictably, optimistic parents and teachers from urban districts across the state celebrated the court's holding that the constitution required Connecticut to integrate its schools 9 The court's decision to confine its remedy to a declaration of the plaintiffs' rights was consistent with the form of the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action (although the plaintiffs had initially requested undefined injunctive relief as well) . In two important respects, however, the Sheif court ignored the special features of the plaintiffs' case discussed earlier in this Part.
95 First, the court ignored who the plaintiffs were; second, it ignored the identity of the defendants. The court's rationale focused on the rights of "the schoolchildren who reside in Hartford and other urban centers in Connecticut,"i ' but white schoolchildren from a Hartford suburb made up more than 10% of the plaintiffs and none of the named plaintiffs was from any of Connecticut's other urban areas. 9 7 Furthermore, the court's opinion and remedy (such as it was) were primarily directed against the general assembly, 9s which had never been named as a defendant, either in its collective capacity or through any legislative official. 99 The potential [Vol. 151: 277 ramifications of the court's sloppiness over the parties' identities will be discussed in Part III.
D. The Plaintiffs Seek a Remedy and Enforcement of the Supreme Court's Holding
Two years after the supreme court's holding, segregation between minorities in Hartford's schools and its suburban neighbors had grown worse, and the plaintiffs returned to court. 1 "" In Connecticut, once ajudge has been reversed on appeal, the case must be remanded to a different judge," so superior court Judge Julia Aurigemma took over the case from Judge Hammer.'°T he supreme court had found the general assembly strictly liable for its constitutional violations, since the legislature had been deemed responsible for finding a solution but had "enacted no legislation that was intended to cause either dejure or de facto segregation.
1 3 Logically, where a party is held liable for the unintended consequences of its acts, good faith can be no defense. However, the remand court's opinion gives extensive coverage to the state's efforts to study and begin to repair the problem of racial isolation, 4 as if good intentions could excuse the state's failure to provide an integrated education. The trial court found that the state's increased spending on "interdistrict cooperative programs, 1 0 "interdistrict magnet schools,' "charter schools,"' ' 7 "minority staff recruitment,"'" the "choice program,"' 0 '° and "lighthouse schools"" 0 were all important remedial steps taken by the legislature and the commissioner of education. The court also noted, as a positive step on the state's part, the significance of the state's 1997 takeover of Hartford's schools due to the elected school board members' inability to work together."' In light of these efforts by the state, all toward purely voluntary integration and none invalidating the shape of any school district, the trial court held that the plaintiffs had "returned to court well before any reasonable efforts could possibly have had any discernible effects."". Conscious of the supreme court's ambivalence toward rapid, politically unpopular remedies,"' Judge Aurigemma held for the defendants. Seemingly in contradiction of the supreme court's holding that the plaintiffs' rights were judicially enforceable, the court concluded that "[t]he best way to achieve popular support is not to impose a judicially mandated remedial plan, but to encourage Connecticut's populace as a whole, both directly and through their elected representatives, to solve the problems facing the state's schools.""' Convinced that the court was 
1,4
The Supreme Court did not specify a time frame for the reduction of racial and ethnic isolation. It used the word "urgent" at the same time it ordered the legislative and executive branches to take action. The Supreme Court was certainly aware that the legislative process is not an instantaneous one and that ... the executive and legislative branches needed sufficient time to propose and enact meaningful legislation. Id. at 939. wrong, but restrained by strategic pragmatism, the plaintiffs decided not to appeal.
5
Finally, more than a year and a half later, the plaintiffs had waited long enough and re-filed a motion to enforce the supreme court's judgment."
6 After further delay to allow a legislative response that never came, the plaintiffs requested that Judge Aurigemma schedule hearings on the case, which began on April 16, 2002.11' The plaintiffs' proposed remedy requires a new infusion of state money to improve Hartford's schools and to expand and improve the interdistrict magnet schools." 8 Although the plaintiffs' lawyers agree that merely improving Hartford's schools with new funding will not, by itself, solve the problem of racial isolation, 9 they have never suggested a mandatory student placement remedy to the courts. 119 See E-mail from John C. Brittain, supra note 115 ("More funding is necessary to achieve educational equity, but increased funding alone for 'school improvement' in the urban disadvantaged school districts will never eliminate . . . extreme racial and ethnic isolation .... ).
120 See Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, Report of Leonard B. Stevens, Ed.D., supra note 118 (recommending voluntary student placements only); Bass, supra note 43 (noting that the plaintiffs have "played footsie with ... the dreaded busing-but have never directly endorsed" it).
provide the state with a binding timeline tied to specific integration goals."' At the conclusion of the spring 2002 hearings in the superior court, Judge Aurigemma's comments showed that the important formalistic aspects of the case are still not being weighed. The specific identities of the defendants still have not been given adequate attention, 1 2 2 nor have the plaintiffs' identities been observed.
3
By acting outside the strictures of regular civil procedure to bind political bodies that had no opportunity to defend themselves in court, whatever remedy the superior court provides is unlikely to appear to the suburban public as a legitimate exercise of the judicial function.
II. OTHERJURISDICTIONS HAVE SOUGHT TO ENFORCE AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS, WITH VARYING SUCCESS
Connecticut's struggle with holding the political branches of government judicially accountable for their affirmative obligations is far from unique. 
A. Federal Courts Have Struggled with Affirmative Constitutional Obligations
Perhaps the most significant federal school desegregation case in recent years has been Missouri v. Jenkins.
In Jenkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where the historical dejure segregation sought to be reversed had not extended beyond school district lines, no federally mandated remedy could so extend.
The district court had overreached its authority by ordering the funding of magnet schools and other educationally appealing features designed to attract subur- 18 See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76 ("Because it had found no interdistrict violation, the District Court could not order mandatory interdistrict redistribution of students between the [Kansas City school district] and the surrounding [suburban school districts].").
ban students into Kansas City's schools. 9 The Court reached this holding despite its awareness that any remedy strictly limited to operation within the city lines would likely result in extreme racial isolation due to the small number of white students residing in Kansas City
130
proper. Two central axioms governing the Court's rationale in Jenkins are uniquely relevant to the federal nature of U.S. courts: the requirement that only de jure segregation can constitutionally be addressed,"' and the need for federal courts to respect the states' historical dominance in the field of education."' Both of these concerns were strongly emphasized in the earlier case of Milliken v. Bradley,1 33 which held that "[b]oundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country." 1 3 4 Plainly, the significance of school district lines varies from state to state, and states have largely retained a more significant control over those boundary lines than has the federal government. The issue of de jure versus de facto segregation also carries different connotations in the federal context than it does under state constitutions, which in many instances include more vigorous equal protection clauses than does the U.S. Constitution. 3 5 Incredibly, Justice Thomas, writing separately in Jenkins, quoted the unequivocal declaration in Brown v. Board of Education that "[s] eparate educational fa-cilities are inherently unequal" 13 6 to support his proposition that "there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment. "
1
This proposition reflects a fundamental assumption that integration is really a matter of educational policy, rather than of legal obligation; that assumption is false in states like Connecticut that have affirmative constitutional obligations to provide an integrated education.
One aspect of Jenkins that does have potential applicability to state desegregation law comes from Justice O'Connor's mitigating concurrence. She opined that the social factors responsible for segregation "are not readily corrected by judicial intervention, but are best addressed by the representative branches; time and again, we have recognized the ample authority legislatures possess to combat racial injustice.""
13
Even this concept is tinged with implied federalism and comity concerns (consider the plural "legislatures," suggesting that the "representative branches" referenced are really state institutions), but the idea can be at least roughly transported to state court concerns about separation of powers.
39 In federal desegregation cases like Milliken and Jenkins, and more generally whenever separation of powers concerns are raised to limit the equitable enforcement of constitutional obligations, much more attention is paid to the inherent limitations of the judiciary than to the institutional weaknesses of the 136 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ).
137 Id. at 121-22. Whether or not separate is still inevitably unequal as a matter of law under the Federal Constitution, the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding in Sheff denies the possibility that racially isolated schools could ever be constitutionally "equal." Therefore, in Connecticut, at least, academic discussion of the potential educational benefits from single-race schooling is legally irrelevant. But cf Alicia L. Mioli, Note, Sheff v. O'Neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps for Poor Urban Minority Schools, 27 FORD1-AM URB. L. J. 1903, 1942 (2000) (arguing that it is more important to improve the quality of racially isolated urban schools than to institute "integrationist" programs devoted to getting "white students and minority students [to] sit next to each other in the classroom").
1" Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (citation omitted). 139 Since most state court judges are elected, Wefing, supra note 67, at 55, most state judiciaries are themselves politically "representative branches." Given the context, though, Justice O'Connor probably did not mean to include judiciaries in her phrase. Whether electoral accountability provides state judges with greater moral authority to interfere with their coordinate branches than federal judges possess remains an open question.
UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW other branches.1 4 0 One might look at the history of the Jenkins litigation itself for a ready example. The case began in 1977'1' and has been in and out of court ever since, having been remanded by the Eighth Circuit for further proceedings as recently as 2000.142 While this protracted history could be explained as illustrative of the courts' failure to fashion a suitable remedy, it might just as well be the result of the political branches' failure to comply with the law as judicially construed. If the latter reason is more persuasive, the solution is likely to be more judicial intervention, not less.
43

B. Other State Courts Have Struggled with Affirmative Constitutional Obligations
Four cases in four different areas of law-three decided this year and one more than three decades old-illustrate different state courts' techniques for enforcing affirmative constitutional obligations. Each case will be discussed in turn, with close attention paid to any procedural characteristics that affected the courts' potential remedies.
In The court noted that the constitutional clause providing for popular initiatives "is plain and unambiguous. If a measure properly enacted by the people is not repealed, the Legislature 'shall' raise by taxation or otherwise and 'shall' appropriate funds to 'carry such law into effect."" 50 Ultimately, the Bates court held that despite this plain constitutional obligation, the plaintiffs' case for injunctive relief failed because the defendant director "has no clean elections funds to distribute and no authority on his own to reach those funds."1 5 1 Even so, the court reached the question of the non-party legislature's obligations, declaring that the state constitution indeed mandated that the legislature either repeal or fund the campaign finance reform laws. This obligation gave rise to a cognizable claim at law for one of the plaintiffs, a gubernatorial candidate who had already been certified as eligible for public financing for his campaign.
On that basis, and despite a vigorous sovereign immunity defense by the commonwealth, the court directed that the certified candidate (alone among the plaintiffs) be awarded the funds he had been promised by the state's campaign finance director. though the legislature had not been made a party to the action and no relief was sought directly against it. Also like the Sheff court, once the Bates majority decided that the legislature's failure to act was unconstitutional, the court ceased its review and declined to command any specific remedy, except with respect to the narrow issue of the single candidate who had already been certified. That exception presents a difference between the Bates and Sheff courts, in that the Massachusetts court was closely attentive to the claims and rights of the specific plaintiffs before it. Providing a damages remedy to one plaintiff but denying the drastic injunctive relief sought by the rest may have permitted the court to demonstrate to the legislature that its affirmative obligations would be enforced without provoking widespread hostility against the court from the political branches. This conclusion may be supported by the Bates court's direction that a single justice would retain jurisdiction over the case in the event future plaintiffs became eligible for relief. The named plaintiffs were twenty urban schoolchildren; they sued the state commissioner of education, budget director, treasurer, and the state board of education for failure to comply with earlier enforcement orders of the court.
16
The Abbott litigation has a lengthy history in New Jersey; the state courts first addressed the case in 1984164 and this year's decision marks the seventh time the state supreme court has adjudicated between the parties.
The plaintiffs argued that preschool programs established by court order in special atrisk school districts (known as "Abbott districts") remained inadequate 166 and sought as relief the implementation of a complex administrative scheme anchored on "the appointment of a judge of the Superior Court to hear and resolve anticipated disputes.", 6 7 In a lengthy opinion heavily reliant on details of school administration, the Abbott court decided that although administrative agency compliance with the court's earlier mandates concerning the preschool programs was inconsistent enough to be "troubl [ing] 1' and as such no new judicial intervention was warranted. 70 After its long years of facing the Abbott litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt qualified to provide responsible state officials with a set of highly detailed requirements for education to be constitutional in NewJersey, down to exactly what preschool curricula were to be employed in the different Abbott districts."' However, the court's descent into extrajudicial detail left little room for explication of the broader historical, moral, and structural trends operating behind the law. While education bureaucrats were provided with a concrete framework for how to come into compliance, the Abbott opinion was not noticeably attentive to the traditional purposes of a constitution. The extraordinary complexity of the Abbott court's opinion, and the court's obvious familiarity with the minutiae of educational policy and procedure, could cause great irritation for someone who believes courts should restrain themselves from imposing remedies requiring continuing judicial activism. Even the Abbott court itself refused the plaintiffs' request that it adopt a more interventionist jurisprudence. However, New Jersey's progress toward educational equity and improved schools for racially and economically isolated children has clearly been accelerated by the supreme court's willingness to impose obligations on its coordinate branches of government.
The final state example of enforcement of affirmative constitutional obligations is the 1971 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. 7ate.
17
The presidentjudge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia brought a class action seeking mandamus on behalf of all Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judges to force the city's executive and legislative branches to fund the court system adequately.
1 73 The remarkable issues facing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as it saw them, were whether the judiciary had the "inherent" power to determine how much money it needed, and if so, whether it could force the other branches to supply the necessary funds.
The court majority used strong moral language, looking to the fundamental structures of republicanism, to hold that such power was inherent in the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.
5
The courts' "inherent power to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of Justice" provided sufficient authority to "protect [that power] from being impaired or destroyed." 1 7 6 By way of remedy, the plaintiffs sought no mere declaratory judgment or voluntary change in legislative priorities; despite "the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia,"' 177 the Carroll court affirmed a trial court judgment awarding nearly 2.5 million (1970) dollars to the Philadelphia court system.
178
The Carroll court never examined any potential problems in obtaining compliance with the monetary award, merely ordering the defendants to provide the court of common pleas with the courtawarded amount.
179 This loud silence might have been deliberately designed to avoid calling attention even to the possibility of noncompliance. It may also have been that the city's cooperation in the early stages of the case provided an adequate bonding mechanism to effectuate the laterjudgment. If no security had been provided, and a city council majority had failed to appropriate the funds after judgment, from whom might the court have realistically been able to compel compliance? Once again, the identity of the parties to the case may solve the problem: The defendants were the mayor, finance director, treasurer, city council president, and the city councillors individually, all named in their official capacities. 8 The least messy judicial solution to noncompliance would probably have been to order 174 Id. 175 See id. at 197 ("Because of the basic functions and inherent powers of the three co-equal Branches of Government, the co-equal independent Judiciary must possess rights and powers co-equal with its functions and duties, including the right and power to protect itself against any impairment thereof."). Unfortunately, the segregated schoolchildren of Hartford have borne the brunt of that willful underenforcement. Chief Justice Peters and the Sheff court may have felt obliged to compromise in the face of intensely emotional opposition to court-ordered desegregation. 8 4 However, leaving the solution to such a controversial problem in the hands of the very people who violated the constitution in the first place is asking the lion to mind the lamb. Governor Rowland's blocking the integration of Hartford Public High School in 2002 by political means is not like Governor Faubus's blocking the integration of Little Rock High School in 1957 by means of force. However, Governor Rowland still has serious reasons to resent any judicial desegregation order. Even if the governor were just a regular private litigant and somehow not accountable to the suburban electorate (and so naturally resistant to any counter-majoritarian decree), it would be extraordinary and unjust for a court to leave the choice of remedy entirely to the discretion of a defendant already found liable for violations of the community's fundamental law.
The Sheff court exercised wishful thinking in assuming that the "energy and good will"' 5 of the political branches would jump into ac-182 Cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (holding that while contempt sanctions were permissible against a city found to be in contempt of a federal district court, fines against city councillors not named as defendants in the original action were an abuse of the court's discretion to craft equitable remedies). 184 See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 124, at 1152 ("Deep-seated public opposition to desegregation, fiscal equity, and other highly controversial decisions undoubtedly has affected the courts' ability and willingness to ensure the implementation of effective remedies in these cases.").
185 Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 , 1290 (Conn. 1996 .
[Vol. 151: 277 tion to send impoverished inner-city minority children flooding into wealthy white suburban schools. Whether the failure to provide specific timelines and desegregation targets was the result of intra-court politics, reluctance to confront the political majority, or even a genuine belief in the philosophy of judicial restraint, the result for Connecticut's constitution and schools has been devastating. The plaintiffs' lawyer Philip Tegeler has succinctly described the state's failure to comply with the supreme court's holding as a "constitutional crisis" in Connecticut. 186 In contrast to the muddied logic of the Sheff case, recall the unmistakably clear commands of the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimously authored opinion in Cooper v. Aaron,"" enforcing the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and demanding political officials' compliance with the lower courts' desegregation decrees:
It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. The Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal.... The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools... is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.1 8
The Cooper opinion recognized that continued refusal by state officials affirmatively to desegregate the nation's schools threatened not only the welfare of affected children, but also the entire relationship between the Constitution, as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the rest of the country. 9 There is no reason to doubt the equal seriousness of state officials' declining to follow state supreme court mandates. The ability of state courts to assert their authority under state constitutions, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Carroll, must be available for the maintenance of the rule of law and constitutional order. A substantively more innovative and procedurally more traditional remedy could provide the fully enforceable remedy the courts have been missing. The essence of this proposal lies in the state supreme Even if that result is not logically compelled by the court's holding, the majority was mistaken to describe the state's obligations in terms of the plaintiffs' rights.
If the Sheff court had more clearly understood school integration as an affirmative obligation of the state, then the natural next step would have been to define the obligation's contours. What, precisely, would the named defendants have to do to comply with their constitutional responsibilities? The general assembly's obligations may be greater or lesser than those of the executive branch officials sued by the plaintiffs, but since the legislators were not a party to the litigation, the court should have declined to declare their rights and responsibilities. Instead, the court should have reviewed the individual defendants' liability, one by one, and directed a remedy strictly to correct that liability.
For example, the court might have held that the commissioner of education's policy-making role in the state's provision of public education meant that his constitutional obligation included the redrawing of school district lines, using racially-inclusive standards. The court might then have given the commissioner a deadline by which to present such new district maps. The remedial regime would then be very similar to that employed in electoral reapportionment cases, which the Bingham County example from Idaho shows is easily within the capacity of the courts. A similar examination of responsibility and assignment of obligation could be applied to each of the executive officials brought before the Sheff court. The hierarchical nature of the executive branch would work to the decreeing court's advantage, because agency officials are institutionally habituated to taking and implementing orders from political superiors.
Such an individualized remedy would have the additional advantage of being enforceable against a natural person, rather than a body politic. It is implausible that any court would (or could) hold an entire legislature in contempt, but the real human being occupying the office of commissioner can easily be subjected to judicial sanctions sufficiently serious to encourage constitutionally mandated conduct.
Once the court has made individual determinations of official liability, an eminently judicial task, there should be no hesitancy to make bold demands on an official's conduct. As one scholar has corand from Greenwich to Granby, is now either clearly or probably unconstitutional .... ).
